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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CLYDE A. JACOBSON and
REGINA J. JACOBSON,
PlaintiffsAppellants,

Case No. 39,647

vs .
CLYDE E. JACOBSON and
ERMA B. JACOBSON,
DefendantsRespondent s .

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

NATURE OF THE CASE

This action was initiated in 1974 for the purpose of
canceling a deed whereby Respondents herein received title to
the subject property from Appellants.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER

COURT

This matter was tried before the Honorable George E
Ballif, in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Utah County,
sitting without a jury.

The Court made findings of fact and

conclusions of law and entered judgment for Respondents, the
Defendants below.

The Court found that the deed to the prop-

erty vesting title in the Respondents is absolute and vests
full legal title free and clear of any and all claims of the
Appellants.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Respondents submit that the decision

of the trial

court was correct and should be affirmed.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

On about August 28, 1962, Appellants purchased the
property in dispute, approximately

twelve acres of land located

in Utah County, under a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Between

1962 and 1965, Appellants occupied the home periodicalLy.

During

the early part of 1965, Appellants became delinquent on the payments for the purchase of the property.
foreclosure proceedings.

The sellers

initiated

As a result of an Order issued bv

the Fourth District Court, Appellants were allowed until June 8,
1965, to pay off the balance of the indebtedness to the sellers
or a judgment of foreclosure would be entered.
On the last day that payment could be made, one Earl
Stubbs, Appellant, and Respondent Jacobson, the father of Appellant Jacobson, met in the office of the sellers 1
Heber Grant Ivins.

attorney,

In order to save the property,, Stubbs
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advanced approximately

$10,000.00; and Respondent

Jacobson

advanced $4,538.10 for the payment of the obligation to
sellers.
Discussion was had with regard to securing the position of Stubbs.

As an alternative to a formal mortgage, a

deed was executed by Appellants.

It appears that the deed

was sent to Stubbs by Attorney Ivins who handled the transaction.

The deed was signed by both Clyde A. Jacobson and Regina

J . J a c o b s o n , Appellants.
Appellants failed to pay to Stubbs and Clyde E.
Jacobson the monies advanced

to the sellers on June of 1965.

As a result of the failure to pay by Appellants, Respondent,
Clyde E. Jacobson, paid off the balance of the debt to Stubbs.
The deed was subsequently recorded on July 18, 1966.

From

that time until the time of the hearing of this matter, Respondents paid all of the taxes and insurance as they became due
on the property.

No payments of any kind were made by Appel-

lants after 19 65.
During the period from 1966 to the initiation of
this action by Appellants, the property was occasionally occupied by Appellants.
Respondents 1

They, together with other members of

family, lived on the property.

Clyde E. Jacobson,

father of Appellant, Clyde A. Jacobson, saw that the property
was taken care of and that the crops were harvested.

The owner-

ship of Respondents was not only evidenced by way of recordation
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but also by open and obvious use of the property.

POINT I

EVEN WHEN THE PROCEEDING TO BE REVIEWED IS IN
EQUITY, THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT
ARE PRESUMED CORRECT.
A suit to have a deed, absolute in form, declared
to be a mortgage, is a suit In equity.

Article VIII, Section

9 of the Utah Constitution allows the Supreme Court to review
questions of law and fact in equity cases.
106 Utah 241, 147 P.2d

853 (L944).

Crockett v. Nish,

In an appropriate case,

this Court can substitute its judgment for that of the trial
court, Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d

1359 (Utah 1974), but

it has been made abundantly clear that this does not amount
to a trial de novo on the merits.

The Appellant has the burden

of proving by a clear preponderance of the evidence that the
trial court's findings and judgment are erroneous.

The Supreme

Court will review the evidence and all inferences fairly to
be drawn therefrom in the light favorable to the trial court's
findings and judgment.

Olsen v. Park Daughters Investment Co.,

29 Utah2d 421, 511 P.2d

145

(1973).

As the Court stated in Del Porto v. Nicolo, 27 Utah2d
286, 495 P.2d

811 (1972):

It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that this
action to avoid deeds is one in equity upon
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which this court has both the prerogative
and the duty to review and weigh the evidence, and to determine the facts. However,
in the practical application of that rule,
it is well established in our decisional
law that due to the advantaged position of
the trial court, in close proximity to the
parties and witnesses, there is indulged a
presumption of correctness of his findings
and judgment, with the burden upon the
appellant to show they were in error; and
where the evidence is in conflict we do not
upset his findings merely because we may have
reviewed the matter differently, but do so
only if the evidence clearly preponderates
against them.
This standard is made even clearer by Crockett v.
Nish, supra, which is also an appeal from a refusal to declare
an absolute deed to be a mortgage.

There the court recognized

its duty to make an independent analysis of the evidence, and
stated:
. . . if at the end of that investigation we
are in doubt or even if there be a slight
preponderance in our minds against the trial
court's conclusions we will affirm.
Other jurisdictions have a standard at least this
stringent.

For example, where a trial court resolved

conflicting

evidence in favor of the defendant in an action to cancel a deed,
the New Mexico Supreme Court considered itself bound thereby.
Westover v. Harris, 137 P.2d

771, 774 (N.M. 1943).

Perhaps a

better rule is found in Blue River Sawmills, Ltd. v. Gates,
358 P.2d

239 (Or. 1960), also an action to have an absolute

deed declared a mortgage.

In that case, noting the trial court's

superior advantage in a matter of this kind, the Oregon Supreme
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Court was inclined to accept his judgment as "very persuasive 11 .
In addition to the foregoing, it should be kept in
mind that the plaintiff faces an especially strict standard of
proof that must be met in order to have an absolute deed
declared a mortgage.

The standard is something more than the

usual requirement of a preponderance, or greater weight of the
evidence, and something less than proof beyond
doubt.

reasonable

Child v. Child, 8 Utah2d 261, 332 P.2d 981, 986

(1958).

This Court required that the evidence, to be adequate for this
purpose, must be clear, unequivocal and satisfactory, Corey v.
Roberts, 82 Utah 445, 25 P.2d

940 (1933); or clear, definite,

unequivocal and conclusive, Thornley Land and Livestock Co. v.
Gailey, 105 Utah 519, 143 P.2d

283 (1943).

Of course, the Court is not limited to examining only
the instrument itself.
evidence.

It may look at all the circumstances in

Parol defeasance is adequate (where not required by

statute to be in writing), but only where precise, definite and
certain.

Bass v. Bell, 41 S.E. 893 (S.C. 1902).

If parol evi-

dence leaves in doubt whether a deed absolute on its face is
a mortgage, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the absolute
character of a deed. Lackey v. First National Bank of Oblong,
32 N.E.2d 949 (111. 1941).
An independent analysis of the evidence in the present
case reveals a clear preponderance in favor of the trial court's
findings and judgment.

Even the parol evidence is not helpful
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to Appellants, as it was admitted in trial that no payments
have been made, nor even any arrangements made to pay, on what
Appellants now choose to characterize as a mortgage. (Tr. 7 2 ) .
(This issue will be more adequately dealt with herein.)

POINT II
THE EQUITABLE DEFENSES OF "UNCLEAN HANDS"
AND LACHES PRECLUDE THE APPELLANTS FROM
MAINTAINING A SUIT IN EQUITY.
A.

The Appellant comes into a court of equity with

"unclean hands", and therefore is not entitled to equitable
relief.
The Appellants have engaged in illegal, fraudulent
and unconscionable conduct, related to this land controversy,
such that no court of equity should even entertain their claim,
far less grant them relief.

In order for this equitable defense

to operate against a party plaintiff, his wrongful actions do
not necessarily have to be fraudulent or illegal, but any unconscientious conduct upon his part which is connected with the
controversy will repel him from the forum whose very
is good conscience.

De Garmo v. Goldman, 123 P.2d

foundation

1 (Cal. 1942)

Yet Appellant Clyde A. Jacobson, the plaintiff below, committed
a criminal act with regard to the property in question.
record discloses that in approximately
filed bankruptcy. (Tr. 4 5 ) .

The

1969, the Appellant

In the course of the bankruptcy

proceedings, he testified under oath that Respondent, his

-7-

father, owned the property in question, (Tr. 4 6 ) .

In the

trial below, his testimony, also under oath, was that he gave
false testimony in the bankruptcy proceedings.
Q.

(By Mr.Randle) . . .[W]hy did you give
that testimony in the bankruptcy court?

A.

To save that property.

0.

Why was it important for you to save that
property?

A.

Well, I am pretty fond of that piece of
property, is all.

Q.

And why were you "fond11 of it?

A.

I don't know; I just liked it. (Tr.46).

First degree perjury was a felony in 1969 and was
covered by the former Criminal Code, §§ 76-45-1 through 7645-13 (see especially

§76-45-7), Utah Code Ann. (1953).

The

new Criminal Code, which was in effect at the time of the trial
below, makes perjury a second degree felony,
76-8-505 (see especially
as amended.

§§76-8-501

through

§76-8-502), Utah Code Ann. (1953),

Whether Appellant committed perjury in the bankruptcy

action or in the trial below

Is not certain, and this is not a

criminal trial for perjury.

But Appellant has obviously sworn

falsely under oath at one time or the other in order to secure
property that he was

fl

fondlf of.

claiming any interest now.
1892).

He should be estopped

from

Reddy v. Aldrich, 11 So. 828 (Miss.

Fondness for property never was a justification for

perjury, theft, robbery or any other crime.
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Appellant has "unclean hands11 in another regard
aside from the perjury.

In the trial below, counsel for the

plaintiff took pains to establish that the purpose in handling
the conveyance in the manner in which it was done was to keep
the property out of reach of Appellant's judgment creditors.
(Tr.

7, 104, 113).

The rule applies here that equity will not

intervene to set aside at the request of a grantor a conveyance
made in fraud of creditors.

Under the "clean hands11 maxim, a

court of equity will not lend its aid to one who has been a
participant in a transaction the purpose of which was to
defraud creditors.
1946).

Wickham v. Simpler, 180 P.2d

171 (Okla.

The fact that an absolute conveyance is purportedly

a mortgage rather than a deed is one of the "badges of fraud".
So also is a delay in recordation of instruments affecting
real property.

Chester B. Brown Co. v. Goff, 403 P.2d 855,

859 (Idaho 1965).
It begins to appear that Appellant has asserted or
denied ownership according to his own convenience.

This may

also serve to estop him from asking relief in equity.
v. Terry, 143 P.2d

In Rh ine

684 (Colo. 1943), the plaintiff denied owner-

ship whenever it would be a burden and asserted ownership whenever there might be a benefit derived, all to the detriment of
the defendant.

The Supreme Court agreed with the trial court

in holding that the plaintiff's action for a declaratory judgment that defendant held title as security rather than in fee
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simple was properly dismissed under the "unclean hands" maxim.
B.

The Appellant's suit is barred by laches .

Equity will not lend its aid to the enforcement of
stale demands.

McKinnon v. Bradley, 165 P.2d 286 (Or. 1946).

The doctrine of laches is derived from the maxim that equity
aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.
Arnold v. Melani, 449 P.2d

800 (Wash. 1969).

Laches is not mere delay, but delay which works to
the disadvantage of another.

In order to constitute laches,

the two elements must be established:
gence on the part of the plaintiff; (2)
owing to such lack of diligence.

(1)

The lack of dili-

An injury

to defendant

Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises

v. Sugarhouse Shopping Center Assoc., 535 P.2d

12 5 6 (Utah

1975).

In determining whether laches will bar a particular
claim, it is proper to consider whether a party or an important
witness has died, and the party against whom the claim is asserted
has been deprived

thereby of important testimony, or whether the

property involved has increased

in value, or whether the prop-

erty has passed into the hands of an innocent third party, or
whether the position of the parties is so changed

otherwise

that an injustice will follow failure to apply the doctrine.
Barrett v. Zenisek, 315 P.2d

1001, 1007 (Mont. 1957).

Applying these statements of law to the present case,
it is clear that laches should bar Appellants from recovery.
First of all, Appellants could have sued for a declaratory
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judgment anytime after 1966 when the deed naming
as grantees was recorded

Respondents

(Tr. 8 ) , but they waited for eight

years, until 1974, to commence this action.

Second, now

Clyde E. Jacobson, one of the original defendants, has died
and taken his testimony with him to the grave.

Erma B.

Jacobson, his wife and a co-defendant, is incapacitated and
unable to give testimony.

Third, according to counsel for

the Appellants, the property has increased in value from
$14,000.00 to over $60,000.00 (Tr. 4 ) .

Fourth, parts of the

property have passed into the hands of innocent third parties
(Tr. 9, 6 6 ) .

From all these facts, it is apparent that the

position of the parties is so changed that an injustice will
follow a failure to apply the doctrine of laches.

Barrett

v. Zenisek, supra.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT THE
EVIDENCE FAILS TO ESTABLISH THAT THE
WARRANTY DEED WAS INTENDED AS A MORTGAGE.
A.

The Appellants did not sustain their burden

of proof.
A party asserting that a deed absolute in form was
given to secure a debt, and therefore is in fact a mortgage,
has the burden of proving the assertion by evidence that is
clear, definite, unequivocal and conclusive, Thornley Land
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and Livestock Co. v. Gailey, supra.

A deed will not be found

to be a mortgage on vague, uncertain or contradictory

evi-

dence, Reeves v. Abercrombie, 19 So. 41 (Ala. 1895), and any
doubt must be resolved in favor of the absolute character of
a deed, Lackey v. First National Bank of Oblong, supra.

The

Appellants had a full and fair hearing, even to the extent
of allowing testimony that is arguably barred by the Dead
Man's Statute, §78-24-2, Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended,
(Tr. 29-36, 67-70), yet they failed to convince the trial
court.

They do not have any lighter burden before this Court.
^•

All the necessary element s o f a _y SL lid deed were

present.
It is undisputed that the deed in question was
delivered and accepted.

Although there was some dispute as

to the property description and the acknowledgement, the
attorney who prepared the papers testified upon cross examination that the legal description was on the deed at the time
it was signed

(Tr. 117-118), and on direct and cross examina-

tion testified that he would not have acknowledged

the signa-

tures of grantors had they not appeared before him and signed
in his presence.
admitted

(Tr. 108, 109; 115, 117).

Appellant also

that the signatures were not forged.
Q.

(By Mr. Stott) Well, your signature
isn't forged is it?

A.

No, my signature is not forged.

Q.

And your wife's signature is not forged,
is it?
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A.

No, it's not forged.

(Tr. 5 5 ) .

Q.

So the record is straight, and counsel
and I understand your testimony, your
wife's signature and your signature is
not forged as they appear on the document
now, are they?

A.

No, It's not a forged signature.

No.

(Tr. 5 7 ) .

The only question left is whether the grantees were
named in the conveyance.

In the first place, the acknowledg-

ment and recordation of a deed give rise to a presumption of
genuineness, due execution and delivery.

This presumption

should not be regarded lightly but should be given great weight,
and not overthrown by a mere preponderance of the evidence.
Northcrest, Inc. v. Walker Bank & Trust Company, 122 Utah 268,
248 P.2d

692 (1952); 1 C.J.S. Acknowledgments

§141, p. 901.

Second, at the time that the grantees names were
filled in, the grantors intended that the grantees should take
title.

This intent was shown by the subsequent conduct of

the parties, as will be discussed infra.

Even if the grantee's

name is not filled in at the time of acknowledgment, if the
blank is filled in by one who had authority to complete the
instrument, the deed becomes operative as a conveyance.
Burnham v. Eschler, 116 Utah 61, 208 P.2d 96 (1949).

Some cases

have held that a deed delivered in blank to the grantee gives
him authority to fill it out in his own name or in the name
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of his grantee or purchaser, and the conveyance relates back
to the time of execution by the grantor.

Fisher v. Paup, 180

N.W. 167 (Iowa 1920); Hoey v. Ebert, 258 N.W. 228 (Mich. 1935);
Holliday v. Clark, 110 S.W.2d 1110 (Mo. 1937).

It is not

necessary that the deed be re-executed or re-acknowledged when
the grantee's name is filled in.

Burnham v. Es chler, supra.

In the present case, the grantees' names were filled
in with the express or imp lied authority of the grantors, as
subsequent events showed.

In any event, when Respondent paid

the full price for the property he became the equitable owner
of the premises and was entitled to a deed, even if the grantor
had refused.

Cf. Hoey v. Ebert, supra.

Any transactions with,

or intent with regards to, Mr. Stubbs are therefore

immaterial

her e.
C.

Based on the evidence before the trial court ,

the necessary elements of a mortgage were not present.
It is true, as Appellant contends, that no particular
form is necessary
v. Stuart,

to constitute an enforceable mortgage.

112 Utah 461, 189 P.2d

v. Stuart is not good authority

118 (1948).

Bybee

However, Bybee

for the Appellant in this case

because in Bybee there was a separate writing, contemporaneous
with the deed, and the two documents taken together
a formal mortgage.

constituted

In the present case not only do we have no

separate writing, but we don't have any parol evidence as to
what the security agreement consisted of.
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What we do have is

the Appellant's testimony that there never really was any
security agreement at all.
Q.

(By Mr. Stott) And your testimony
further, as I understood it, was that
there never really was any type of an
arrangement or agreement that you had
with your father as to how this money
was to be repaid or in what manner it
was to be repaid by, or under what terms,
is that right?

A.

No.

Q.

You never did have an arrangement with
him then, did you?

A.

We never did, no.

Q.

It was also your testimony, as I noted
it, that there never was an arrangement
between you and Mr. Stubbs, was there?

A.

No.

(Tr. 7 2 ) .

This case is closely analogous to Hunter v. Bane,
149 S.E. 467 (Va. 1929), in which the Court's finding that
no mortgage existed was "inevitable" when the record showed
that the grantor conveyed property encumbered with deed of
trust liens to prevent foreclosure; no definite time was stated
in the deed for repayment of the money advanced by grantee to
relieve grantor of financial embarrassment; no offer was ever
made by grantor to repay the money; there was no express agreement in the deed in regard to payment of interest; grantee
improved the property; and grantee paid the taxes and insurance
on the property for a period of years.

In addition, the Court

noted that the fact that grantor had "remained in part possession of the property, when viewed in light of the circumstances
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detailed, cannot be regarded as inconsistent with an absolute
conveyance of the same."

149 S.E. at 469.

In the present case, the trial court found that no
evidence was introduced of the essential terms of a mortgage
such as interest rate, term of repayment, or other
of any enforceable mortgage or security agreement.

requirements
The Court

further found that such essential elements would not be provided
by the Court for the parties.
D.

The subsequent actions and conduct of the parties

show that Appellants intended to, and did, convey all interest
in the property to Respondents.
In determining whether an absolute deed was intended
as a deed or a mortgage, the courts may look at the relative
situation of the parties prior to, at the time of and after
the execution of the instruments, Holmes v. Basham, 45 S.E.2d
252 (W.Va. 1947); their conduct, Morris v. Rickmeyer, 82 P.2d
472 (Cal. 1938); and their subsequent dealings with the property, Thornley Land and Livestock Co. v. Gailey, supra; Corey
v. Roberts, supra.
The following factors and circumstances show that
Appellants intended to and in fact did abandon alL claims or
interest in the property:
1.

Appellant Regina Jacobson, in her initial plead-

ing of a divorce suit brought against Clyde A. Jacobson in
1973,

claimed no interest in the property.
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The latter, in his

responsive pleadings, likewise failed to claim an interest
in the property.
2.

(Tr. 60, 6 1 ) .

In bankruptcy proceedings, as evidenced by the

certified record from the bankruptcy court, an exhibit in this
case, Appellant not only failed to claim an interest in the
property, but testified under oath that it belonged to Respondent. This Court may well choose to believe that testimony.
3.

For much of the time between the conveyance to

Respondents and the present, Appellants did not occupy the
premises.

By Appellant's own testimony in court, he established

that he moved in and out.
to-six month period.

(Tr. 4 9 ) .

He was gone for one four-

On another occasion, he moved to a home

in Payson while Respondents' daughter and son-in-law occupied
the premises for just short of a year, (Tr. 5 0 ) .

Finally, in

1973, Appellants abandoned the property completely and moved
to Orem (Tr. 51) where they continue to reside.
4.

In addition to these absences, Appellants only

assisted occasionally in managing or maintaining the property.
It was farmed and maintained primarily by the Respondents,
who openly dealt with the property as their own.
5.

Appellants made no payments at all on what they

now choose to characterize as a mortgage.
Q.

(By Mr. Stott) During the time that you
lived on the property, you paid no one any
sums of money for your occupancy on the
property, did you?
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A.

No.

(Tr. 62)

Q.

And you have paid nothing toward, either
to Mr. Stubbs or to your father, or to
your father's estate toward the purchase
of that property, have you?

A.

No.

(Tr. 7 2 ) .

There was some testimony

that Appellant helped his

father out on weekends, but there was no evidence whatsoever
of the value of those services or that they were pursuant to
an agreement.

For all that appears on the record, such actions

were nothing more than what any son would do for his father.
6.

The Respondents conveyed away part of the land

and received the payments therefor.
7.

(Tr. 9 ) .

The Respondents paid all the taxes, insurance,

and assessments on the property from the time of the conveyance
to the present.

No taxes, insurance or assessments were paid

by the Appellants during that entire period.

(The Appellant

contends that he allowed the Respondent to take the money from
the lease payments and the crop harvest to pay the taxes.
However, that is not probative of ownership in this case,
because whether or not that money was Appellant's to give
depends upon ownership of the property.
question in issue here.)
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That is the whole

CONCLUSION

Appellants paid a down payment and two years 1 worth
of monthly installments, plus incidental weekend favors, for
a piece of property they now acknowledge is worth in excess of
$60,000.00.

They claim this property free and clear.

They

are not really asking this Court to declare the deed a mortgage.
That would involve interest rates, terms of repayment, etc.,
which the Court cannot supply for the parties.

They are really

asking this Court to just give them the property.

Respondents

paid full price for the property years ago, recorded their
deed, paid the taxes, insurance, etc., and generally
the property as their own.

treated

Appellants had notice of to whom

the title was registered since 1966, but waited eight years
to assert their ownership.

Now the Respondents are dead or

incapacitated and unable to effectively defend their title.
Thus, especially in light of the Appellants 1 unconscionable and illegal conduct with respect to the property,
it would be a manifest injustice to the Respondents and their
heirs or devisees to wrest the property from them and give
it to Appellants.

The judgment of the trial court is clearly

correct and should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
/ /
I ' JF**#--GARY i/T/STOTT
84 Eas-t 100 South
Provo, Utah
84601
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